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The access control guide covers the configuration model. This page covers where each check runs, the exact thresholds, and visibility scoping.

Two layers, checked in different places

User to agent

Every route touching a specific agent — proxying a chat request, updating, deleting, reading or rotating secrets — resolves access the same way: ownership, the public flag, or an explicit grant. A soft-deleted agent is denied unconditionally.
Plans: Pro and Enterprise. Self-hosted: Enterprise license.
On a self-hosted open-source server, access comes from ownership, the public flag, or a grant to a single user. On Pro and Enterprise, and on a self-hosted Enterprise server, a grant can name a user, an org unit, or the whole organization. A grant on an org unit reaches everyone placed in that unit or any unit beneath it, and the unit’s lead. It doesn’t flow upward: a grant on Engineering > SRE doesn’t reach someone placed only in Engineering. A grant to the organization reaches every signed-in user of the deployment. Mutating operations (update, delete, secrets, ACL changes) use a stricter check: neither a public flag nor an invoke-only grant confers the right to modify or destroy an agent. Only ownership or superuser does. On Nasiko Cloud and on a self-hosted Enterprise server, the admin role can also change an agent’s grants, name, and owner. The distinction matters because view access is granted far more often than manage access — conflating them would let a public flag double as a management grant.

Agent to agent

Whenever an authorized agent calls another agent, a separate check applies: is this hop allowed? It’s governed by an allowlist of caller/target pairs.
The allowlist restricts only once it has entries. An agent with no allowlist entries can call any agent. As soon as an agent has one or more entries, it can call only the agents listed. If you add an entry for an agent that already calls others, add every target it needs.
The check runs immediately before the target is invoked, in the same pass as the flow guard’s cascade limits. A rejection from either aborts the call before it reaches the target container. On a self-hosted open-source server, the agent’s owner manages its allowlist in the agent’s Access tab, or with POST /api/agents/{id}/grants/agents and DELETE /api/agents/{id}/grants/agents/{target_agent_id}. See Agent access API.
On an Enterprise deployment, nasiko-ee access grant <agent-id> --agent <other-agent-id> is an access grant, not an allowlist entry: it adds <agent-id> to the agents <other-agent-id> can reach (nasiko-ee access accessible-agents). See Agent grants API.
Which agents a MAF workflow reaches is governed at authoring time — who can create a workflow and which agents they name — not by this allowlist.

Role hierarchy

Plans: Pro and Enterprise. Self-hosted: Enterprise license.
On a self-hosted open-source server, every signed-in user can deploy agents, and managing users needs the admin role or superuser. There is no manager role or org-scoped visibility. Roles rank strictly: admin > manager > member. An unrecognized role value ranks as member rather than defaulting to trusted. Capabilities are gated by a minimum role. Anyone at or above it qualifies: A manager’s reach comes from the units they lead, not from the role name. A manager who leads no unit administers nothing. A manager can grant only roles below their own, and can act only on users below their own rank. An agent’s configuration and secrets are managed by its owner or a superuser. Its grants, name, and owner can also be changed by an admin. Role and superuser are independent. A superuser passes every check regardless of role. Promoting someone to admin does not make them a superuser.
A role is a capability tier, not a grant on any agent. Meeting a threshold means you may attempt that class of action — whether you can act on a particular agent is still decided by the ownership and grant model above.

Org-scoped visibility

Plans: Pro and Enterprise. Self-hosted: Enterprise license.
On a self-hosted open-source server, every signed-in user can see every other user. Nasiko also scopes which users a caller can see. An admin or superuser sees everyone. A manager sees the people in the units they belong to and everyone anywhere beneath a unit they lead. A member can’t list users or read the org structure; those reads return {"available": false} instead of an error. When sharing a connector, a member can still pick colleagues from the units they belong to. This is what keeps user-listing and user-search endpoints from leaking every organization’s roster to every signed-in account on a shared deployment.

Access control overview

Roles, grants, and allowlists.

User → agent access

Ownership, public flags, and grants day to day.

Routing and flow limits

The flow guard checked alongside the allowlist.

MCP tool access

A parallel permission model for tool access.